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Executive Summary
The Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008 was introduced as a bill in 2008 following
an increased uproar from the public regarding the current system of setting fees that
merchants pay for credit card transactions. Many viewed the current system as unfair,
unjust, anti-competitive and secretive with the hidden fees.
The bill was introduced in the House Judiciary Committee on March 6, 2008 by
John Conyers; Chris Cannon from Utah was among the forty five co-sponsors of the
legislation. The bill is designed to reinforce transparency and competition in the credit
card industry. This bill does not set prices. Instead, it requires that fees be set in a
transparent manner so that other companies can compete for business and consumers do
not pay artificially high rates.
The Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008 authorizes providers of a single covered
electronic payment system (e.g. Visa or Master charge credit cards) and any merchants to
jointly negotiate and agree upon rates and terms for access to such a system. It defines
covered electronic payment system as any system that has been used for at least twenty
percent of the combined dollar value of United States credit, signature-based debit, and
PIN-based debit card payments processed in the applicable base year. Moreover, it grants
limited antitrust immunity to such providers and merchants, as well as to those providers
who jointly determine among themselves the proportionate division of paid access fees. It
also sets forth procedures to determine rates and terms for access to a covered electronic
payment system.
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The Act prohibits any other rates and terms from being imposed upon a merchant
for accessing a covered electronic payment system except as specified in a voluntarily
negotiated access agreement. It also sets to create a panel of three full-time Electronic
Payment System Judges, appointed by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Competition, to determine the schedule of
rates and terms for three-year periods. The judges will act as the judicial review
committee of the bill. It will authorize providers and merchants to engage in voluntarily
negotiated access agreements. It will declare that such voluntarily negotiated access
agreements shall be given effect with respect to the signatories in lieu of any
determination by the judges.
Congress began debating on the Act on March 6, 2008 with a growing number of
card issuers increasing their profits by loading their credit cards with tricks and traps. The
bill did not go through the first time but the current economic situation in America and
the rising consumers’ complaints made Congress to revisit the bill. The bill’s first phase
of implementation will be in November of 2009.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008,
analyze the inception of the Act’s concept and compare what other scholars and writers
are saying and/or writing about the Act. The paper also highlights what society has to say
about the inception of the bill.
Currently, there is still a lack of short-term credit in the United States economy,
making financing for businesses, individuals, and even governments difficult. Credit
markets remain paralyzed, with everything on hold and with many major corporations
having failed or at the brink of failing. At the same time, hedge funds and private equity
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funds, that have provided some small amount of lending, are unwinding, accelerating the
economic decline. Until bank and non-bank financial institutions resume lending, there
will be a continuing downward economic spiral. The Act, if approved by both houses of
the U.S. Congress and signed into law, will provide for better lending terms to avoid
future relapse on the current situation.
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Congressional Regulation of Credit Card Interest Rates:
The Case of Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008

Introduction
After years of having its way with American consumers the multi-million credit
card businesses may soon face greater oversight and tighter reins. For years, retailers and
merchants have been waging a quiet war with the financial industry over "interchange
fees" -- the hidden costs of processing credit transactions that can wipe out a store's
profits while earning banks a pretty penny (Bosworth, 2008).
The Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008 authorizes providers of a single covered
electronic payment system (e.g., Visa or Master charge credit cards) and any merchants
to jointly negotiate and agree upon rates and terms for access to such a system. It defines
covered electronic payment system as any system that has been used for at least twenty
percent of the combined dollar value of U.S. credit, signature-based debit, and PIN-based
debit card payments processed in the applicable base year. Moreover, it grants limited
antitrust immunity to such providers and merchants, as well as to those providers who
jointly determine among themselves the proportionate division of paid access fees. It also
sets forth procedures to determine rates and terms for access to a covered electronic
payment system.
The Act prohibits any other rates and terms from being imposed upon a merchant
for accessing a covered electronic payment system except as specified in a voluntarily
negotiated access agreement. It also sets to create a panel of three full-time Electronic
Payment System Judges, appointed by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
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and the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Competition, to determine the schedule of
rates and terms for three-year periods. It will authorize providers and merchants to
engage in voluntarily negotiated access agreements. It will declare that such voluntarily
negotiated access agreements shall be given effect with respect to the signatories in lieu
of any determination by the judges (Berner, 2008).

Purpose of the Study
A growing number of credit and loan issuers increase their profits by loading
their credit cards with tricks and traps so that they can catch consumers who stumble or
mistake those traps for treasure and find themselves caught in a snare from which they
cannot escape (Darlin, 2005). The paper examines the Congressional Credit Card Fair
Fee Act that begun being debated upon in the House of Representatives on March 6,
2008. The analysis is a descriptive study of what other scholars, writers, general public
are writing and saying about the Act. It also compares what different people in the society
are saying about the Act and whether or not it is beneficial to them. It ascertains whether
or not the Act is a positive law to be enacted.
To accomplish this, other acts that work hand in hand with the Credit Card Fair
Fee Act are mentioned in the paper establishing the background and formation of the
Act. Some of these acts include the Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of
1988, the Home Equity Loan Consumer Protection Act of 1988, the Home Ownership
and Equity Protection Act of 1994, the TILA Amendments of 1995, and the Economic
Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996 (EGRPRA).

3

Due to the fact that this is a very controversial topic, different views collected
along the way are used to show how, over the years, the act has been instigated. The
society’s reception is also investigated in the paper. Definitions and tables are appended
to this paper to clarify to reader’s information they may not know.

Background
The Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008 draws from the Truth in Lending Act. The
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) of 1968 is a United States federal law designed to protect
consumers in credit transactions, by requiring clear disclosure of key terms of the lending
arrangement and all costs. The statute is contained in Title I of the Act, as amended.
Congress calls the bill the Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008 and is still looking at
other bills at the moment that deal with the same information. The bill has not been
passed but the current economic repression in America is facilitating the rebirth of the
Credit Card fair Fee Act of 2008. The first phase is going to be passed in November of
2009.
The Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008 was sponsored and introduced in the House
Judiciary Committee by John Conyers and co-sponsored by 45 members of Congress.
The bill is designed to reinforce transparency and competition in the credit card industry.
The current system of setting fees that merchants pay for credit card transactions is anticompetitive and secretive. This bill does not set prices. Instead, it requires that fees be set
in a transparent manner so other companies can compete for business and consumers
would not pay artificially high rates (Gavin, 2007).
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The main players in the formation and presentation of the Credit Card Fair Fee
Act of 2008 are: Mr. Conyers; Mr. Canon, Ms. Zoe Lofgren of California; Mr. Shuster,
Mr. Weiner, Mr. Delahunt, Mr. Platts, Mr. Welcof Vermont, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Wilson of
South Carolina, Mr. Gohmet, Mr. Hall of Texas, Mr. Boozman, and Mr. Peterson of
Pennsylvania. These legislators introduced the bill, which was referred to the House
Judiciary Committee.

Literature Review
Visa and MasterCard have for a long time kept their interchange fee structure
hidden for many years, preventing merchants from accurately gauging how much they
are really paying, and leading a group of merchants to file a class-action lawsuit
demanding changes to the system. Both Visa and MasterCard have since published their
fee breakdowns, although critics charge the structures are still too complex for anyone to
understand (U.S. Government Accountability Office, September 2006). Both Visa and
MasterCard have set aside considerable war chests to pay for the potential costs of losing
the litigation, and have committed to massive Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in order to
defray more risk onto shareholders.
Interchange fees cost the average American family three hundred and fifty per
year, according to statistics from the National Retail Federation. Americans pay
interchange fees of two percent on all transactions made with plastic, higher than any
industrialized nation in the world (National Retail Federation, 2004).
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Retailers testified to Congress in July 2007 on the hidden penalties of interchange
fees, and today they welcomed the new legislation. The bill would allow businesses to
negotiate their credit card transaction fees. Since merchants often recover these high fees
by increasing their prices, consumers will likely receive a positive result if the bill is
passed. A lot of retailers are in agreement with the Act and believe that Congress should
have acted on it before now (Hughes, Middlebrook, and Brooks, 2006).
Credit card statistics are easy to find and hard to verify. However, it appears that
roughly seventy-five percent of American households have credit cards, and about fifty
percent of all households carry balances on those cards (Rinearson, 2004). The average
debt load per credit card is about ten-thousand dollars, and the average interest rate on
that debt is currently about fifteen percent (Rinearson, 2004). Consumers are generally
unaware of interchange fees, as they are folded into the total price of items bought and
are not disclosed on receipts. But merchants are acutely aware of the fees, as they force
storeowners and retailers to raise prices on all their items in order to make a profit,
effectively penalizing customers who shop only with cash and not pay fees of any kind
(Rinearson, 2004).
Sullivan (1999) was of the view that that many consumers are, in fact, stalled
in the middle of the busy intersection between Rock Street and Hard Place Boulevard in
today’s tough economy. Consumers can expect to see their fees and penalties more
clearly defined and more completely explained. They can expect to see interest-rate
penalties capped in a rational manner. Probably most significantly, they will be insulated
from rate increases caused by adverse information that might appear on credit reports. In
other words, credit card issuers will be prohibited from jacking up rates on consumers
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who have a negative pop on their credit reports. In addition, certain types of predatory
sales practices primarily targeting young and inexperienced credit card users will be
limited or stopped (Sullivan, 1999).
It is interesting to note that the argument on credit cards did not spring into
Congress in 2008 but dates back to as early as the 1900s. Other acts work hand in hand
with the 2008 Credit Card Fair Fee Act. Some of these acts include: the Fair Credit and
Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988, the Home Equity Loan Consumer Protection Act of
1988, the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, the TILA Amendments of
1995, and the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996. The
most important Act is the Truth in Lending Act of 1968.
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) of 1968 is a United States federal law designed
to protect consumers in credit transactions, by requiring clear disclosure of key terms of
the lending arrangement and all costs (Title 15 of the United States Code). The purpose
of TILA is to promote the informed use of consumer credit by requiring disclosures about
its terms and the cost to standardize the manner in which costs associated with borrowing
are calculated and disclosed. TILA also gives consumers the right to cancel certain credit
transactions that involve a lien on a consumer's principal dwelling, regulates certain
credit card practices, and provides a means for fair and timely resolution of credit billing
disputes. With the exception of certain high-cost mortgage loans, TILA does not regulate
the charges that may be imposed for consumer credit. Rather, it requires uniform or
standardized disclosure of costs and charges so that consumers can shop. The regulation
prohibits certain acts or practices in connection with credit secured by a consumer's
principal dwelling as mandated by Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968.
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The TILA was first amended in 1970 to prohibit unsolicited credit cards.
Additional major amendments to the TILA and Regulation Z were made
by the Fair Credit Billing Act of 1974, the Consumer Leasing Act of
1976, the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 1980.
Regulation Z also was amended to implement section 1204 of the
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, and in 1988, to include
adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) loan disclosure requirements. All
consumer leasing provisions were deleted from Regulation Z in 1981
and transferred to Regulation M (12 CFR 213) (Comptroller’s
Handbook Truth in Lending Act, 1).
The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 imposed on the TILA
new disclosure requirements and substantive limitations on certain closed-end mortgage
loans bearing rates or fees above a certain percentage or amount. The law also included
new disclosure requirements to assist consumers in comparing the costs and other
material considerations of a reverse mortgage transaction, and authorized the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) to prohibit specific acts and practices
in connection with mortgage transactions (Comptroller’s Handbook Truth in Lending
Act).
The TILA Amendments of 1995 dealt primarily with tolerance for real estate
secured credit. Regulation Z was amended on September 14, 1996 to incorporate changes
to the TILA that limit lenders’ liability for disclosure errors in loans secured by real
estate consummated after September 30, 1995. The EGRPRA amendments were made to
simplify and improve disclosures related to credit transactions (Comptrollers’ Handbook
Truth in Lending Act).
The Electronic Signatures in the Global and National Commerce Act (the E-Sign
Act), 15 USC 7001 et seq., was enacted in 2000 and did not require implementing
regulations. On November 9, 2007, the amendments to Regulation Z and the official staff
commentary were issued to simplify the regulation and provide guidance on the
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electronic delivery of disclosures consistent with the E-Sign Act (Comptrollers’
Handbook Truth in Lending Act).

The statute TILA is divided into two main parts:
1. Subpart A contains general information such as the authority, purpose,
coverage, and organization of the regulation; the definitions of basic
terms; the transactions that are exempt from coverage (which would be
any business purpose loan); and the method of determining the finance
charge.
2. Subpart B contains the rules for open-end credit. It requires that initial
disclosures and periodic statements be provided, as well as additional
disclosures for credit and charge card applications and solicitations and for
home-equity plans, subject to the requirement by law. The Subpart also
covers the right of rescission requirements and the advertising restrictions
for open-end credit. For example, a home equity line of credit
advertisement cannot mention any tax benefits without verbiage
suggesting that the consumer consult a tax adviser (Comptroller’s
Handbook Truth in Lending Act).
Regulation Z, which is subpart A of the TILA remains highly influential in the
arguments been raised in congress in regard to the Fair Fee Act of 2008. A major
argument being raised is with the involvement of credit cards; generally exempt credit
(e.g., business purpose credit) is subject to the requirements that govern the issuance of
credit cards and liability for their unauthorized use. Credit cards must not be issued on
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an unsolicited basis and, if a credit card is lost or stolen, the cardholder must not be held
liable for more than fifty dollars for the unauthorized use of the card.
TILA played a very significant part in the formation of the Credit Card Fair Fee
Act of 2008. However, there are other bills in 2009 that Senators across the United
States are introducing to the Senate for discussion. These bills are examining the fact
that seventy percent of the United States credit and debit market collected thirty-billion
in interchange fees in 2007. There is no meaningful competition or negotiation involved
in the setting of interchange fees, as major credit cards companies like Visa and
MasterCard simply set non-negotiable interchange fees rates for all banks and retailers
that participate in the card systems. These rates result in increased revenue for the card
issuers but drain the bottom lines of retailers and raise prices for consumers. Retailers
are forced to abide by these fees because their credit and debit cards are used over fortypercent of all transactions in the United States and most retailers cannot stay in business
if they do not accept these cards (Saunders, 2008).
The public commends the President of the United States, Barrack Obama, for
confronting credit card issuers about abusive practices and renewing his push for credit
card reform legislation. “The President recognizes that we cannot let the very banks we
rescued compound the hardships of ordinary Americans with extra ordinary unfair fees
and interest charges,” Comments Senator Levin (Levin, 2009).
Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, who is the chairman of the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigators, has conducted an ongoing investigation into unfair and
abusive credit card practices. In two investigative hearings, Levin pulled the curtain
back on some of the outrageous credit card abuses such as imposing interest rates as
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high as thirty-two percent, charging interest for debt that was paid on time, imposing
excessive fees and hiking interest rates for consumers who can pay on time (Levin,
2009).
Levin introduced a 2007 credit card reform bill, S. 1395, whose provisions were
largely incorporated into S. 3252 of the Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008. The Senate
bill (S. 3252) was introduced by Banking Committee chairman Chris Dodd, DConnecticut, and cosponsored by Levin, then Senator Obama, and other Senators. The
2009 Credit Card Act, S. 414, is the successor to the Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008
(Levin, 2009).
Last year, the House approved a less ambitious credit card reform bill that is yet
to be acted on by the Senate. Earlier this week, the House Financial Services Committee
approved a similar bill that is expected to be presented to the full House for another
vote. In December 2008, the Federal Reserve approved regulations to end some credit
card abuses (Levin, 2009).
Another U.S. Senator, Dick Durbin, on June 5, 2008 introduced a legislation to
allow large and small businesses to negotiate directly with credit card companies to
reduce the interchange fees that are charged on every credit card transaction. According
to Durbin, “higher interchange fees for businesses mean higher costs for retailers and
consumers. Every time you make a purchase with plastic, the bank that issued your
credit gets a cut from the sale amount. American businesses and consumers are getting
nickled and dimed by the big banks. Interchange fees need to be fairly and transparently
negotiated between the merchants and the credit card companies who represent the
banks’ interest so working American’s do not get short changed” (Durbin, 2009).
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The Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008 Provisions
The Act provides the following:
•

Consumers under the age of twenty-one should be allowed to choose whether to
receive credit card solicitations. Card issuers can only solicit young consumers if
they receive affirmative consent in advance.

•

Card issuers cannot use the widespread practice of charging higher interest rates
on balances incurred before a rate increase goes into effect.

•

Credit card issuers cannot alter credit card agreements while they are in force
without specific written consent from the cardholder. This will stop issuers from
giving themselves the right in cardholder agreements to increase interest rates and
fees at any time, for any reason.

•

Penalty fees ought to be reasonably related to the costs that credit card issuers
incur because of a late or over-limit transgression.

•

Credit card issuers cannot increase a cardholders’ interest rate based on adverse
information relating to other creditors they find on the consumers credit report.

•

Card issuers should be required to limit penalty interest rate increases to seven
percent above the previous rate if a consumer fails, for instance, to make a
payment on time.

•

Late fees on payments that have been postmarked by a designated date be
disclosed to the consumer.

•

Issuing credit or raising credit limits to consumers should be done only when the
consumer is capable of making scheduled payments based on their current
income, obligations, and employment status.
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•

Lenders should make a firm offer of credit that includes specific — not
deceptively low — terms, including the interest rate, fees, and credit line (Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking).

Similarities between the TILA and the Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008
The Credit Card Fair Fee Act is intended to ensure that credit terms are disclosed in a
meaningful way so consumers can compare credit terms more readily and
knowledgeably. On the same note, the TILA of 1968 also advocated for truth in lending.
Before its enactment, consumers were faced with a bewildering array of credit terms and
rates. It was difficult to compare loans because they were seldom presented in the same
format. Now, all creditors must use the same credit terminology and expressions of rates.
Some similarities of TILA and the Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008 include the
following:

•

Both TILA and the Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008 protect the consumers
against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices;

•

Both provide consumers with rescission rights;

•

Both provide for rate caps on certain dwelling-secured variable rate loans; and

•

They both impose limits on home equity lines of credit and certain closed-end
home mortgages.
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Evaluations to be Followed before Giving Credit
To accomplish its goals, the Credit Card Fair Fee Act borrowed from the TILA’s
evaluations to be used when determining if credit is for consumer purposes, the creditor
must evaluate all of the following:
•

Any statement obtained from the consumer describing the purpose of the
proceeds:
For example, a statement that the proceeds will be used for a
vacation trip would indicate a consumer purpose. If the loan has a
mixed-purpose (e.g., proceeds will be used to buy a car that will be
used for personal and business purposes), the lender must look to
the primary purpose of the loan to decide if disclosures are
necessary. A statement of purpose from the consumer will help the
lender make that decision. A checked box indicating that the loan is
for a business purpose, absent any documentation showing the
intended use of the proceeds could be insufficient evidence that the
loan did not have a consumer purpose (Truth in Lending Act, 5).

•

The consumer’s primary occupation and how it relates to the use of the proceeds.
The higher the correlation between the consumer’s occupation and the property
purchased from the loan proceeds, the greater the likelihood that the loan has a
business purpose. For example, proceeds used to purchase dental supplies for a
dentist would indicate a business purpose.

•

Personal management of the assets purchased from proceeds. The less the
borrower is personally involved in managing the investment or enterprise
purchased by the loan proceeds, the less likely the loan will have a business
purpose. For example, money borrowed to purchase stock in an automobile
company by an individual who does not work for that company would indicate a
personal investment and a consumer purpose.
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•

The size of the transaction. The larger the size of the transaction, the more likely
the loan will have a business purpose. For example, if the loan is for a $5,000,000
real estate transaction, that might indicate a business purpose.

•

The relative amount of income derived from the property acquired by the loan
proceeds; the less the income derived from the acquired property relative to the
borrower’s total income, the more likely the loan will have a consumer purpose.
For example, if the borrower has an annual salary of $100,000 and receives about
$500 in annual dividends from the acquired property that would indicate a
consumer purpose (Comptroller’s Handbook Truth in Lending Act, 7-15).
All five factors must be evaluated before the lender can conclude that disclosures

are not necessary. Normally, no one factor by itself is sufficient to determine the
applicability of Regulation Z from TILA. In any event, the bank may routinely furnish
disclosures to the borrower. Disclosure under such circumstances does not determine that
the transaction is covered under the Regulation Z but can assure protection to the bank
and in compliance with the law.

Terms Commonly Used When Dealing With Credit
The Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008 helps to assure that consumers have a right
to know about the agreements that they are getting into in terms of fees, payment and
rates on their loans. A lot of times the consumers do not know the terms that banking and
lending institutions use. One of the major arguments was that some terms are not well
defined. Outlined below are some of the words commonly used in the banking and
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lending industry that the common person does not know off hand unless s/he conducts
some studies.

The Annual Percentage Rate
The Annual Percentage Rate (APR) is a function of:
•

The amount financed, which is not necessarily equivalent to the loan amount. If
the consumer must pay at closing a separate one percent loan origination fee
(prepaid finance charge) on a $100,000 residential mortgage loan, the loan
amount is $100,000, but the amount financed would be $100,000 less the $1,000
loan fee, or $99,000.

•

The finance charge, which is not necessarily equivalent to the total interest
amount. Interest, which is defined by state or other federal law, is not defined by
Regulation Z. Charges may or may not be considered a finance charge because of
exemptions or conditions. For example, if the consumer must pay a $25 credit
report fee for an auto loan, the fee must be included in the finance charge. The
finance charge in that case is the sum of the interest on the loan (i.e., interest
generated by the application of a percentage rate against the loan amount) plus the
$25 credit report fee. If the consumer must pay a $25 credit report fee for a loan
secured by real property, the credit report fee must be excluded from the finance
charge. Assuming there are no additional fees or charges assessed in the
connection with the mortgage loan, the finance charge would be only the interest
on the loan. Refer to the section on finance charge for clarification.
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•

The payment schedule, which does not necessarily include only principal and
interest (P + I) payments. If the consumer borrows $2,500 for a vacation trip at 14
percent simple interest per annum and repays that amount with 25 equal monthly
payments beginning one month from (Truth in Lending Act Comptroller’s
Handbook, 12).

The Credit Card Fair Fee Act argues that consumers knowing this information will assist
in making educated decisions and thus being fair on consumers.

Determining the Balance and Computing the Finance Charge
Each finance charge imposed must be individually itemized. The aggregate
total amount of the finance charge need not be disclosed. The Credit Card Fair Fee
Act of 2008 dictates that the examiner must know how to compute the balance to
which the periodic rate is applied. Common methods used are the previous balance
method, the daily balance method, and the average daily balance method:
•

Previous balance method. The balance on which the periodic finance charge is
computed is based on the balance outstanding at the start of the billing cycle. The
periodic rate is multiplied by this balance to compute the finance charge.

•

Daily balance method. A daily periodic rate is applied to either the balance on
each day in the cycle or the sum of the balances on each of the days in the cycle.
If a daily periodic rate is multiplied by the balance on each day in the billing
cycle, the finance charge is the sum of the products. If the daily periodic rate is
multiplied by the sum of all the daily balances, the result is the finance charge.
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•

Average daily balance method. The average daily balance is the sum of the daily
balances (either including or excluding current transactions) divided by the
number of days in the billing cycle. A periodic rate is then multiplied by the
average daily balance to determine the finance charge. If the periodic rate is a
daily one, the product of the rate multiplied by the average balance is multiplied
by the number of days in the cycle (Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008).
If a creditor fails to comply with any requirements of the Act, other than with the

advertising provisions of chapter three, it may be held liable to the consumer for the
actual damage and the cost of any legal action together with reasonable attorney’s
fees in a successful action.
A creditor that fails to comply with the Act’s requirements for high-cost
mortgage loans may be held liable to the consumer for all finance charges and fees
paid by the consumer. Any subsequent assignee is subject to all claims and defenses
that the consumer could assert against the creditor, unless the assignee demonstrates
that it could not reasonably have determined that the loan was subject to section
226.32 of the Criminal Liability Section 112(Credit Fair Fee Act of 2008).
The Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008 authorizes federal regulatory agencies to
require banks to make monetary and other adjustments to the consumers’ accounts
when the true finance charge or APR exceeds the disclosed finance charge or APR by
more than a specified accuracy tolerance. That authorization extends to unintentional
errors, including isolated violations (e.g., an error that occurred only once or errors,
often without a common cause, that occurred infrequently and randomly).
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Under certain circumstances, the Act requires federal regulatory agencies to order
banks to reimburse consumers when understatement of the APR or finance charge
involves: patterns or practices of violations (e.g., errors that occurred, often with a
common cause, consistently or frequently, reflecting a pattern with a specific type or
types of consumer credit); gross negligence; and willful noncompliance intended to
mislead the person to whom the credit was extended.
Any proceeding that may be brought by a regulatory agency against a creditor may be
maintained against any assignee of the creditor if the violation is apparent on the face of
the disclosure statement or other documents assigned, except where the assignment was
involuntary (Comptroller’s Handbook Truth in Lending Act).

Relationship of the Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008 to State Law
State laws that impose responsibilities on banks offering consumer credit, or
that require such institutions or consumers to follow certain procedures, or that grant
rights to consumers or banks in consumer credit contracts: may be preempted by the
Credit Card Act; may not be preempted by the Credit Card Act; or may be substituted
for the TILA and Regulation Z requirements.
The TILA does not preclude preemption of state law by other federal statues,
such as the National Bank Act. State law provisions are preempted to the extent that
they contradict the requirements in the following chapters of the TILA and the
implementing sections of Regulation Z which were the main sub branches of the Credit
Card Fair Fee Act of 2008.
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Major Arguments of the Credit Card Act of 2008
Arguments backing the importance of the legislation of the Act notwithstanding
any provision of the antitrust laws show that in negotiating access rates and terms and
participating in any proceedings in accordance with subsection (d), declare that any
providers of a single covered electronic payment system and any merchants may jointly
negotiate and agree upon the rates and terms for access to the covered electronic payment
system, including through the use of common agents that represent either providers of a
single covered electronic payment system or merchants on a non-exclusive basis. Any
providers of a single covered electronic payment system also may jointly determine the
proportionate division among themselves of paid access fees.
Proceedings under this Act shall determine rates and terms for access to a covered
electronic payment system during the 3-year period beginning on January first of the
second year following the year in which the proceedings are to be commenced, except
where a different transitional period is provided under section 6. Except as specified in a
voluntarily negotiated access agreement, no other fees, terms, or conditions of any kind
may be imposed directly or indirectly on any merchant for accessing a covered electronic
payment system. The parties to each proceeding shall bear their own costs (Credit Card
Fair Fee Act of 2008).

Determinations of the Electronic Payment System Judges
The Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008 determined that the judges will look at applicability
that is, the schedule of rates and terms determined by the Electronic Payment System
Judges with respect to a single covered electronic payment system shall, subject to
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paragraph (4), be binding on all providers of that single covered electronic payment
system and merchants affected by this paragraph during the 3-year period specified in
subparagraph (1). For any given covered electronic payment system, such rates and terms
shall be the same for all merchants, regardless of merchant category or volume of
transactions (either in number or dollar value) generated (Credit Card Fair Fee Act of
2008).
The standard for determination will be used in establishing rates and terms for
access to a covered electronic payment system by merchants, the Electronic Payment
System Judges shall establish rates and terms that most closely represent the rates and
terms that would be negotiated in a hypothetical perfectly competitive marketplace for
access to an electronic payment system between a willing buyer with no market power
and a willing seller with no market power. In determining such rates and terms, the
Electronic Payment System Judges shall consider the costs necessary to provide and
access an electronic payment system for processing credit and/or debit card transactions
as well as a normal rate of return in such a hypothetical perfectly competitive
marketplace. The Electronic Payment System Judges shall not include any
anticompetitive rates or terms (Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008).
Participants in the arguments that were raised in Congress brought up common
methods that banks have in calculating the balance to which the periodic rate is applied.
By reading the bank’s explanation, the examiner should be able to calculate the balance
to which the periodic rate was applied. In some cases, the examiner may need to obtain
additional information from the bank to verify the explanation disclosed. Any inability to
understand the disclosed explanation should be discussed with management, who should
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be reminded of Regulation Z’s requirement that disclosures be clear and conspicuous. If a
balance is determined without first deducting all credits and payments made during the
billing cycle, that fact and the amount of the credits and payments must be disclosed
(Kulikowski, 2008).
If the bank uses the daily balance method and applies a single daily periodic then
the disclosure should state the balance for each day in the billing cycle. The daily
periodic rate is multiplied by the balance on each day and the sum is the finance charge.
It should also include the balance for each day in the billing cycle on which the balance
in the account changes. The finance charge is figured by the same method as discussed
previously, but the statement shows the balance only for those days on which the balance
changed. Another important inclusion is the sum of the daily balances during the billing
cycle. The balance on which the finance charge is computed is the sum of all the daily
balances in the billing cycle. The daily periodic rate is multiplied by that balance to
determine the finance charge. Finally the average daily balance during the billing cycle if
stated, however, the bank must explain somewhere on the periodic statement or in an
accompanying document that the finance charge is or may be determined by multiplying
the average daily balance by the number of days in the billing cycle, rather than by
multiplying the product by the daily periodic rate (Truth in Lending Act Comptroller’s
Handbook, 16).
On the other hand, if the bank uses the daily balance method, but applies two
or more daily periodic rates, the sum of the daily balances may not be used.
Acceptable ways of disclosing the balances include: a balance for each day in the
billing cycle; a balance for each day in the billing cycle on which the balance in the
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account changes; or two or more average daily balances. If the average daily
balances are stated, the bank shall indicate on the periodic statement or in an
accompanying document that the finance charge is or may be determined by
multiplying each of the average daily balances by the number of days in the billing
cycle (or if the daily rate varies, by multiplying the number of days that the
applicable rate was in effect), multiplying each of the results by the applicable daily
periodic rate, and adding the products together.
In explaining the method used to find the balance on which the finance charge is
computed, the bank need not reveal how it allocates payments or credits. That
information may be disclosed as additional information, but all required information must
be clear and conspicuous.

Examples of Loans Taken By Consumers
In explaining the Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008, examples were pulled from
the TILA report. For example, consummation of a transaction of 2,500 with the monthly
principal and interest payment will be $115.87, if all months are considered equal, and
the amount financed would be $2,500. If the consumer’s payments are increased by $2.00
a month to pay a non-financed (for illustrative purpose, there is no interest component)
$50 loan fee over the life of the loan, the amount financed would remain at $2,500 but the
payment schedule would be increased to $117.87 a month, the finance charge would
increase by $50, and there would be a corresponding increase in the APR. This would be
the case whether or not state law defines the $50 loan fee as interest. If the loan above has
55 days to the first payment and the consumer prepays interest at consummation ($24.31
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to cover the first 25 days), the amount financed would be $2,500 minus $24.31, or
$2,475.69. Although the amount financed has been reduced to reflect the consumer’s
reduced use of available funds at consummation, the time interval during which the
consumer has use of the $2,475.69, 55 days to the first payment, has not changed. Since
the first payment period exceeds the limits of the regulation’s minor irregularities
provisions (see section 226.17(c)(4)), it may not be treated as regular. In calculating the
APR, the first payment period must include the additional 25 days, i.e., the first payment
period may not be treated as one month (Michel, Bernstein, and Allegretto, 2007).
Another instance offered in a Newsweek article took a closer look at a ten
thousand dollar credit card balance and a fourteen percent APR. At this rate, the annual
debt service (the amount of interest paid each year) is about one thousand five hundred
dollars. This particular figure represents simple interest only. Cardholders who make
their minimum payment each month will usually continue to see their bottom-line creditcard debt grow – and they will be charged interest on that amount as well. Essentially,
strapped cardholders pay interest on interest. This is called compound interest, which is
the eighth wonder of the world for credit card issuers and a potential nightmare for
cardholders (Berner, 2008).
Views and Opinions about the Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008
Due to the controversy of the subject matter, Congress created an online link,
(http://www.opencongress.org/bill/110-h5546/show) where people give views on Credit
Card Fair Fee Act of 2008. Some views collected include:
Kim, Jane J.

Kim Jane asks if the Truth in Lending Act can be the law that saves the American
consumer from foreclosure and financial death. Will attorneys finally get a clue and learn

24

this area of ”mortgage law” and start the massive wave of class action lawsuits that have
yet to make noise in our Federal Court system? The facts are that this law represents an
uncharted territory and it is a new and exciting frontier for those of the legal cloth that
wish to explore this potentially lucrative area (suing lenders). This law is exciting and
should be used to its full capabilities, so it can be used to protect borrowers who are in
toxic mortgages and or facing foreclosure (Retrieved March 2, 2009).

Moe Berdard: Capital Times
Most people remember the late U.S. senator from Wisconsin, William Proxmire,
for his monthly “Golden Fleece” awards, which he used to cite government programs for
their colossal waste of taxpayers’ dollars.
Proxmire made consumer protection his mission when he was elected to the U.S.
Senate, taking the seat held by the censured and expired Joe McCarthy. He believed that
the financial industry was frequently misleading borrowers about the true cost of credit
on everything from mortgages to auto loans.
During the 1960s he and a handful of fellow members of Congress introduced a
number of reforms. Getting them passed took a while. The financial industry fought tooth
and nail against them. There were some small gains, like giving a borrower a window to
get out of a loan on second thought.
Finally in 1968, Congress passed Proxmire’s Truth in Lending Act, a major piece
of legislation that for the first time required lenders to make the interest rate and total cost
of a loan absolutely clear. That act produced the APR, the annual percentage rate, that
takes into account both the interest rate and any fees that the lender may tack on.
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The Capital Times goes on to explain that this law may have a profound effect on
lending institutions and investors, if a particular class action case is allowed to proceed in
the Federal Court of Milwaukee. His opinion is that this is only a logical conclusion and
ending of a lending world that was not clear on the mortgages they sold to consumers.
The terms were a far cry from “absolutely clear.” In fact they were “absolutely unclear,
unfair and deceptive.” Not only did the consumer get unfair and deceptive treatment from
the lenders, they also got it from the realtors, the appraisers, title agents, investments
brokerages,

and

many

more.

Now using the law and other consumer laws to protect the American people, the
time is now and the fight is starting. Get on the legal gloves and do something.
Interestingly, Proxmire’s act may figure prominently in the current subprime mortgage
crisis, which has many home buyers feeling betrayed by their financial institutions.

Carey Spivak
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reporter Carey Spivak reported recently on a
Cedarburg couple who filed a class-action suit against Washington, D.C.-based Chevy
Chase Bank. The couple had refinanced their home with the bank for what they thought
was a 1.95 percent interest rate for five years. Turned out, though, that the couple was
stunned to learn that the one point ninety-five percent was a “teaser” rate for just one
month.
The mortgage industry is worried that if the lawsuit is allowed to proceed as a
class action, rather than people being required to sue individually, the door could be
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opened to several other large suits, adding to the financial misery that the industry is
already suffering.
No matter which way the courts rule — whether the suit can proceed as a class
action or the couple must sue as individuals — the basis for the suit is that 1968 Truth in
Lending Act, which requires lenders to leave no ambiguity about the true interest rate.
Proxmire’s trailblazing efforts are still serving to protect consumers some 40 years later.

Martin Bosworth
Martin Bosworth says “The outset that this legislation is a typical beltway
boondoggle. Credit card debt is up, housing is down, and so Congress goes after the evil
credit card companies. Never mind about the consumer who spends every dime he makes
plus another 25% or so.” The main question asked is, should fraudulent and deceptive
practices be targeted? Absolutely, and there are plenty of laws and regulations to do so.
The problem with the legislation, however, is that it takes aim at the wrong problem
while creating several others at the same time. If a voluntary agreement cannot be
reached, both sides would have to submit to binding arbitration overseen by the Justice
Department and the Federal Trade Commission (Bosworth, 2008).
This legislation does not stop credit card companies from making the profit the
market allows them to make. What it will do, however, is change how they do it. If you
limit a credit card company’s ability to increase rates, they would just increase the
starting rate. Balance transfer credit cards and cash back credit cards will probably be
affected, too. The point is that credit card companies make what the market will bear.
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Apart from stopping deceptive and fraudulent practices, the government should not get in
the way of the free market.
His question on Congress is “why don’t you enact the Consumer Reform Act of
2008?” Here would be its salient points:
•

A consumer’s total used and available credit on all credit cards may not exceed an
amount equal to 20% of their gross annual salary;

•

All credit card charges must be paid in full before the next billing cycle except
where (1) the interest rate charged by the credit card company is 0%, or (2) a true
financial emergency prohibits payment of the full charges; and

•

All high schools must offer and all high school students must take a course on
personal finance, including how to use credit cards responsibly.

Conclusion
In conclusion, it is true that credit card companies can increase interest rates,
sometimes excessively (although states already have laws limiting the maximum interest
rate that can be charged). And yes, credit card companies charge fees for late payments
that greatly exceed the actual damage they suffer from the late payment. But there is a
simple solution to these problem–consumers can either use the credit they have
responsibly or not get a credit card in the first place. Are there circumstances truly
outside a consumer’s control that causes them to pay a credit card bill late? Probably; but
do we need federal legislation to tackle that problem?
The first phase to be implemented in November is definitely a curtain raiser to the
Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008. Current recession and decline of the economy in
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general has pressures both the government and consumers to enact the Act sooner than
expected.
Do credit card companies take advantage of consumers in financial crisis? Sure.
Should this be stopped if it constitutes fraudulent or deceitful practices? Most
definitely—to say the least. However, blaming the credit card companies is, in my
opinion, pointing the finger in the wrong direction, it is not going to solve the current
problem on credit cards and right pricing. Standardization has proved to be effective over
the years and having a basic standard for all financial institutions will definitely help
stabilize the rates that that financial institutions impose on the public.
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APPENDIX

DEFINITIONS

‘‘Access Agreement’’ means an agreement giving a merchant permission to access a
covered electronic payment system to accept credit cards and/or debit cards from
consumers for payment for goods and services as well as to receive payment for such
goods and services, conditioned solely upon the merchant complying with the rates and
terms specific field in the agreement.

‘‘Acquirer’’ means a financial institution that provides services allowing merchants to
access an electronic payment system to accept credit cards and/or debit cards for
payment, but does not include independent third party processors that may act as the
acquirer’s agent in processing general-purpose credit or debit card transactions.

‘‘Antitrust Division’’ means the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice

‘‘Antitrust Laws’’ has the meaning given it in subsection (a) of the first section of the
Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)), except that such term includes section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent section 5 applies to unfair methods of
competition as well as any similar State law.

‘‘Base year’’ means the most recent full calendar year prior to the initiation of a
proceeding under this Act.
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‘‘Commission’’ means the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Competition.

‘‘Credit card’’ means any general-purpose card or other device issued or approved for
use by a financial institution allowing the cardholder to obtain goods or services on credit
on terms specified by that financial institution.

‘‘Covered electronic payment system’’ means an electronic payment system that has
been used for at least 20% of the combined dollar value of U.S credit, signature-based
debit, and PIN-based debit card payments processed in the applicable base year.

‘‘Debit card’’ means any general-purpose card or other device issued or approved for use
by a financial institution for use in debiting a cardholder’s account for the purpose of that
cardholder obtaining goods or services, whether authorization is signature-based or PINbased.

‘‘Electronic payment system’’ means the proprietary services and infrastructure that route
information and data to facilitate transaction authorization, clearance, and settlement that
merchants must access in order to accept a specific brand of general-purpose credit
and/or debit cards as payment for goods and services.

‘‘Financial institution’’ has the same meaning as in section 603(t) of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.
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‘‘Issuer’’ means a financial institution that issues credit cards and/or debit cards or
approves the use of other devices for use in an electronic payment system, but does not
include independent third party processors that may act as the issuer’s agent in processing
general-purpose credit or debit card transactions.

‘Market power’’ means the ability profitably to raise prices above those that would be
charged in a perfectly competitive market.

‘‘Merchant’’ means any person who accepts credit cards and/or debit cards in payment
for goods or services that they provide.

‘‘Normal rate of return’’ means the average rate of return that a firm would receive in an
industry when conditions of perfect competition prevail.

‘‘Party’’ means either all providers of a single covered electronic payment system
collectively or all merchants collectively.

‘‘Person’’ has the meaning given it in subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton
Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)).

‘‘Provider’’ means any person who owns, operates, controls, serves as an issuer, or
serves as an acquirer for a covered electronic payment system.
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‘‘State’’ has the meaning given it in section 4G(2) of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15g(2)).

‘‘Terms’’ means all rules applicable either to providers of a single covered electronic
payment system or to merchants, and that are required in order to provide or access that
covered electronic payment system for processing credit and/or debit card transactions.

‘‘Voluntarily negotiated access agreement’’ means an executed agreement voluntarily
negotiated between 1 or more providers of a single covered electronic payment system
and 1 or more merchants that sets the rates and terms pursuant to which the1 or more
merchants can access that covered electronic payment system to accept credit cards
and/or debit cards from consumers for payment of goods and services, and receive
payment for such goods and services.

.
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